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THE PHILIPPINES

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REPORTS

By

Lieutenant-General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A.

Reprinted From

Army and Navy Journal, May 2, 1903.



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Lieutenant-General Nelson A. Miles, U.S.A.

Reprinted from Army and Navy Journal, May 2, 1903.

Headquarters of the Army,

February 19, 1903.

The Honorable, the Secretary of War.

Sir: I have the honor to report that I arrived in the harbor of Manila on the evening of October 30, 1902, and went on shore the next morning. On the following day I reviewed all the troops in and about Manila, comprising some 3,500 men, and on the 2d and 3d of November visited several places of military interest, and returned the call of Admiral Wildes, U. S. Navy, commanding the United States Squadron in the harbor of Cavite.

On November 4th I went over the Manila and Dagupan Railway to its terminus at Dagupan, reviewing the troops along the line and also examining the sites for military stations, and returned the following day.

The despatch boat Ingalls having been placed at my disposal, was directed to proceed to Batangas to meet me there on the 9th. In the meantime I proceeded up the Pasig river and across Laguna de Bay in a steam launch, landing at Culamba, and thence proceeded along the road to Batangas, inspecting the various military stations at Culamba, Tunuan, Lipa, Santo Tomas and Batangas, and also the site for a military station which had been selected at the latter place. This site is well located, has a good elevation and appeared to be suitable for all military purposes should it be thought advisable to build a permanent post there.

The Ingalls having arrived in the harbor of Batangas shortly after my arrival, I went aboard that night and proceeded to Cavite, and thence to Hollo, both on the island of Panay. After examining the troops, buildings and camps at the latter place, I left there on the 11th, arriving at Ilassi on the morning of the 13th, and at Jolo on the same day, completing my inspections of both places.

Leaving Jolo on the evening of the 13th, I proceeded to Malubang, island of Mindanao, arriving about 11 a. m., and proceeded at once over the road constructed by the military to Camp Vlears, near Lake Lanao, a distance of 22 miles. En route I visited the camp situated five miles from Malubang, and those at Matuling Falls and Camp Jessman. A great work has been done by the troops in constructing a good military road, passing for about 16 miles through a dense tropical forest. At Camp Jessman the country becomes open, and from there on to Lake Lanao, about six miles, there is a very fine country, ele-

vated, picturesque and healthful. Although a number of natives were engaged in the transportation of freight on their backs and with very small ponies, and others were met passing along the road, the country between the coast and the camp on the lake appeared to have been practically abandoned by the natives. On the following morning I visited the scene of the recent operations against the Moros, examining their forts which had been captured by the troops under command of General Baldwin, and also observing the lake and the country about it. The section of country on the other side of the lake appears to be well settled and occupied by natives, and a fort located there was said to be held by them. The lake is about 18 miles long, varying in width, with an area of about 100 square miles, and is well sheltered on all sides by hills and high ground. Three steel gunboats had been transported here by the Spaniards, and were in use at the time of our operations in 1898, and were sunk by them after Manila was taken. It is very apparent that if these vessels could be raised and used, or others brought here, this problem of reducing or controlling these people in case of continued hostilities does not appear to be a difficult one. They are very poorly armed, and have no means of withstanding our mountain artillery and field mortars. Their forts possess but slight resisting power, and can easily be destroyed by modern artillery. After a careful inspection of the troops and camp, which I found to be in excellent condition, I returned to Malubang on the same day, and left for Parang Parang, about 25 miles distant. A naval station is located there, and the harbor is good and said to be generally safe. The garrison consists of two companies of the 27th Infantry and a detachment of engineers. There is an excellent site here for a military station, with an elevation of about 150 feet above sea level. The officers at present are quartered in ulpa huts, and the men in the old Spanish barracks.

Returning to the transport, I left for the mouth of the Rio Grande river, which was reached the same evening. The following morning I proceeded up the river in a steam launch to Cottabato, a few miles distant, where there are stationed two companies of the 10th Infantry in the old Spanish quarters. On a hill half a mile distant, at an elevation of about 180 feet, there is a set of quarters, formerly occupied by the Spaniards, where one company was located, but now occupied by a detachment, the company being absent on duty

between Malabang and Camp Vicars.

I proceeded up the Rio Grande, about 35 miles, visiting the camp of a detachment which is stationed at the village of the Datto Plang, who appears to be the controlling Moro in this section, he evidently having much influence with his people. He is intelligent and apparently friendly. This river is the most important in Mindanao, and along its valley a large population is sustained. It is navigable for boats of light draft, and in case of hostilities must be controlled by our troops. The three points, Malabang, Parang Parang and Cottabato are all, as has been stated, garrisoned by troops. The proposition of establishing permanent stations has been considered, and I deem it inadvisable to construct them at the three different points. As Parang Parang occupies the central position and appears to be, in point of harbor and locality, the most suited for a larger camp, it would be best, in my opinion, to construct such station at this point, and to retain for a time detachments or outposts at Cottabato and Malabang. The distance by land from Parang Parang to Cottabato is only about 15 miles, and the country is such that a good road could easily be constructed between these two points and the troops moved rapidly in case of necessity. It would also appear to be advisable to construct a road from Parang Parang to Malabang, or direct to Lake Lanao. The distance cannot be much greater to Camp Vicars from this point than from Malabang, but as to practicability of building a road by this route, I am not informed, but it would be desirable, before a decision is reached as to the location of permanent buildings, to thoroughly consider this matter.

The Rio Grande is reported to overflow at times and to seriously injure the crops in the valley. It heads near Lake Lanao, and is said to be 150 miles long and navigable for small boats for 50 or 60 miles. A small gunboat followed us to within about three miles of Datto Plang's village, as far as it could go on account of a bar in the river at that point.

Leaving the Rio Grande river on the evening of the 16th, I arrived on the following morning at Zamboanga, the headquarters of the Department of Mindanao. The barracks here are especially good, having been built by the Spaniards. A wharf, with a horse tramway to the old fort in the town, have been constructed under the direction of the military, the rails having been brought from Iligan, where the Spaniards had commenced the construction of a railroad to Lake Lanao. The fort is still in an excellent state of preservation, strongly built on the Vauban system. It was held successfully by the Spanish against the Filipinos until the arrival of our troops during the recent war. It is now used as a storehouse for commissary and quartermaster supplies.

Among the natives here met was Datto Mandi, who is a most progressive Moro. He is an intelligent and educated man, and has adopted European customs, freeing his slaves of his own volition.

This port is important, and is visited by a number of merchant ships going to Australia and other parts.

In the afternoon of the same day I proceeded to Iligan, where I arrived on the

morning of the 18th. The harbor here is open, and a landing can only be made from small boats. The surrounding country is very undesirable. The Spaniards appear to have attached much importance to this point, and had constructed a road to Lake Lanao over which the gunboats placed upon the lake were transported in sections. A railroad to the lake also had been commenced; about a mile of the rails, as before stated, having been transported to Zamboanga and used for a tramway. A part of the roadbed is still in existence, and some of the rails in position. It is evident that the road to Lake Lanao, which had been used as stated for the transportation of gunboats, must have been in very good condition in 1898, and it would seem that a road sufficiently serviceable for the operations of our troops could be prepared without great labor in a short time over its route. The troops, however, are now employed in the construction of a permanent road five miles along the coast and then up the Agus river to intersect the old road at a point about 18 miles from Iligan. At the time of my visit there were 600 of our men at work on this road. The heat was intense, and there were at the time 70 men sick, and some 200 men attended sick report. Heavy timbers were being cut, and in every respect a road of a permanent character was being constructed. Unless there be some great military necessity—and I know of none—this work should not be performed by troops. I was informed that the Moros had made propositions to furnish the necessary men. There appeared to be very great dissatisfaction and just ground for complaint. Officers and men, dressed in laboring clothes, with an armed guard, were moving about in the heat and dust. At the rate at which the work is being done it does not appear possible that it can be completed in less than twelve months, as the work is very heavy and difficult. It appears that the permanent character of this road is being considered in order that an electric road may be operated later, the power for same being generated by using the falls on the Agus river about half a mile above its mouth. I was informed that no men can be re-enlisted at this point, and all who have any possible grounds are asking to be discharged. It was stated that in one company all of the non-commissioned officers and a large percentage of the men had asked for their discharge under the recent order reducing the number of troops in the islands. If troops are to be used unnecessarily in such labor without compensation, it is evident that the service in these islands will be made exceedingly undesirable, while the performance of such labor, unless absolute military necessity exists for it, is wrong and contrary to law. The attention of the Division Commander was called to this condition of affairs.

On the same evening I proceeded to Cebu, where I arrived on the following morning. This town is of considerable importance, and has one of the best harbors in the islands. There is a great need of wharves for the accommodation of vessels. If permission were granted to extend the present wharves 20 feet, vessels of the largest size could go alongside and discharge their cargoes. This is one of the most important hemp ports in the Archipelago. The old Spanish barracks are oc-

cupied by our troops and are very good and suitable for the purpose.

I left at midnight for Tacloban, Leyte, arriving at San Juanica Straits the following morning, from which point I proceeded by a small steamer provided by the Department Commander to Tacloban, arriving there the same afternoon. The district commander had ordered the troops of his command near at hand into the town in order that they might be inspected. I examined the site which had been selected for the station of troops, and it appeared to be suitable and conveniently located. This garrison is intended for the protection and control of both this island and Samar in the vicinity. After the completion of the inspection here I left that night and proceeded to Calbayog, where I landed the following morning. There is one company of the 1st Infantry and a company of scouts stationed at this point. Here, as well as at Tacloban, there were a number of cases of beri-beri, at this point confined to the scouts, but at Tacloban there were three cases among the American troops. It is proposed also to establish a post at this place. The site selected is located in a coconut grove about 1.1-2 miles from the present station. Although the elevation is low, it is said to be comparatively healthful.

The same day I proceeded to Lagan, where I arrived on the night of the 22nd. On the next morning I went ashore and visited the station. The troops are partly quartered in an old convent and in other buildings rented for the purpose. Another company is stationed up the Catubig river, which can be navigated for about 85 or 40 miles in small boats, and in case of operations into the interior this river will be valuable as a means of transportation. This station is important, it being situated near the Straits of San Bernardino, and is said to be the location for the landing of the Pacific cable. I returned to the transport and left for Legaspi, Luzon. In entering the harbor at this point, at about 2.30 p. m., the Ingalls ran upon a reef, and was unable to move until later, when the tide rose. In the meantime I went ashore in the launch and made inspection of the troops in the town, and at a point about 5 miles distant. This is an important harbor on account of its large shipments of hemp. Two companies of the 26th Infantry are stationed here. Much damage was done to the outlying towns during the war, the town of Albay having been practically destroyed. That night I returned aboard the Ingalls, which had been floated, and proceeded to the town of Pasacao, which was reached the next morning. A company of infantry had been stationed here, but part of it had been withdrawn, leaving only a detachment, which was soon to be moved to Nueva Caereres. The ladrones had been operating in this vicinity, and the Presidente asked that the troops be left there as a protection.

I had intended to visit Nueva Caereres, but was unable to do so on account of want of transportation, and proceeded the same afternoon to Manila, where I arrived the next day at 10 a. m.

I remained at Manila until the night of November 28, completing my examination of barracks, buildings, etc., and attending to other duties.

I again boarded the Ingalls that night, and left for Subig Bay, arriving at the Naval Station at Olongapo the next day, where I went ashore and inspected the station. Considerable work had been done by the Spaniards here with a view to making this a strong naval station. The bay is well sheltered and affords ample anchorage for a large number of ships. Its defense would be comparatively easy and at moderate expense. In my opinion the work should be completed, and necessary arrangements made for the coaling, dockage and repairing of ships.

I left Olongapo and the Philippine Islands on the afternoon of the same day.

The general condition of the troops in the Archipelago was creditable to themselves and to the country. The officers and soldiers made a good appearance. They seemed to be earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties, notwithstanding the fact that the commands were divided, frequently into small detachments, and scattered to remote and widely distant stations.

The effect of the climate is a most serious detriment to the service. The men go there in perfect health and in the prime of manhood, but as a body are seriously affected in the course of two or three years' service. Very few escape, but the majority are debilitated. The effect of the climate upon the families of officers and soldiers is more perceptible. They being the weaker element, quickly become a prey to the injurious effects. Many of the officers have been obliged to send their families home, or to a northern climate, like Japan to recuperate.

I saw no white men employed in the fields or at outdoor labor, except a few in large cities.

As the military stations, with but few exceptions, are very remote, and the troops are required to be in communities that are neither beneficial nor congenial to them, the service is depressing, and, to some extent, has a demoralizing effect. There are scarcely any amusements or recreation for the soldiers, and life under such circumstances becomes very monotonous. During my visits to the garrisons it so happened that I did not see a single soldier under the influence of liquor. I visited the hospitals and the guardhouses, and in the former I did not find a single patient suffering from alcoholism, while in the latter there were but very few men under the charge of drunkenness. While the list of sick is very large, the number of men in confinement was exceedingly small, at some posts and camps not a single soldier being in the guardhouse. The following statement shows the exact condition of the troops at 122 stations in the Philippine Islands, being all but 19 remote stations, on a single day, viz., November 27, 1902: Troops on duty, 17,574; sick, 1,415; under arrest or in confinement, including 42 scouts, 531, of which number 174 were charged with drunkenness; total troops, 19,520; total percentage of sick, .0724; total percentage under arrest, .0272; percentage of those under arrest charged with drunkenness, .3277; total percentage of command under arrest charged with drunkenness, .0089.

While this statement shows a serious condition as to the health of the commands, it is a most favorable report as to sobriety.

As to result of my observations it is my judgment that the discontinuance of the liquor feature of the canteen has been beneficial to the army. Now that the temptation has been removed from the immediate presence of the young men of the army, they are less likely to indulge in the use of liquor. There is a small percentage of men in the army who were addicted to strong drink before enlistment, and whether it is obtainable in the canteen or not has very little effect upon such men. They would resort to places outside the garrison under any circumstances. Their influence, however, is less pernicious now than formerly. At present the canteens, recreation rooms or libraries, whichever they may be called, they are frequently all embraced in one—are quite orderly and occupied by sober men. Considering the remote, and in some respects, desolate stations, this feature of the service requires far more attention and more liberal appropriations, not only for the moral, but for the healthful well-being of the army. Every effort should be made to improve the conditions by affording ample comfort and means of recreation and amusement to soldiers under such circumstances, and I recommend that most liberal appropriations be made and allowances granted for the further development and improvement of this feature of the military service. In fact, at every military post it should be made the duty of some efficient officer to develop and promote this feature of the service in every way possible for the contentment, happiness and general welfare of the troops.

The number of troops that will be required to occupy the Philippine Islands is still problematical. While it is claimed that the people are pacified, evidences of hostility toward American sovereignty are apparent. The newspapers published in both Spanish and English contain almost daily accounts of hostilities, depredations or disturbances of the peace. Against these armed hands the Civil Government is employing the constabulary, a force of about 6,000 men.

In my judgment, the Heavy Artillery troops now in the Philippine Islands should be withdrawn without delay, as there is no legitimate use for them in the Archipelago, not a single high-power gun or mortar being mounted, and there probably will not be for several years. Their services are required in the United States.

Concerning the mounted troops, there is quite as much, if not more, need for cavalry in the Philippine Islands as in the United States, and as some of the cavalry regiments have never served in the Philippines, I think it advisable that they should share their proportion of the duties in that country.

I found a large proportion of the troops occupying church property, monasteries, colleges and convents. This, I believe, to be entirely wrong, and it should be discontinued without delay. It is a serious detriment to the property, and while it may prevent destruction by fire to some extent, yet the damage done to the buildings will be extensive. They were not constructed for such purposes, and it will simply result in claims for some millions of dollars being brought against the United States, which will undoubtedly have to be paid.

Until such time—at present very remote

—as it can be determined exactly what force will be required, the troops should, in my judgment, occupy, first, the commodious buildings which have been erected by the Spaniards in the most available parts of the Archipelago, and which are capable of accommodating, after slight repairs have been made approximately 12,000 troops; and, second, nipa buildings, which are the most suitable that can be used for the shelter of troops. They are cool and comfortable, affording ample shelter from the intense heat of the sun as well as from severe rainstorms. I noticed several large enough to accommodate an entire company which cost less than \$1,000 each. They will last three or four years, when, if necessary, they can be renewed. The experience of the natives for hundreds of years has demonstrated the utility and economy of this kind of shelter; besides, if this class of buildings is occupied in this way for a few years, it would demonstrate the healthfulness or unhealthfulness of certain districts, thus avoiding the possible mistake of constructing permanent buildings in unhealthful localities.

While the supplies have, as a rule, been abundant and of good quality, there is, in my opinion, too much cold storage meat used for the good of the troops. Its constant use becomes very distasteful, and in the opinion of many eminent physicians it is not the most healthful. Instead of bringing so much frozen meat as at present and having it stored for a long time in the cold storage warehouse at Manila and then distributed to different posts, it would, in my opinion, be advisable to send Government steamers to Australia and have them loaded with live stock, which can be distributed in small quantities near the different garrisons so that they could at any time have fresh beef and mutton as a part of the ration.

In regard to certain strategic positions to be occupied by the United States military and naval forces, I am still of the same opinion that I entertained as soon as the news of the naval victory at Manila had been received, although no action has yet been taken, except to make certain surveys and plans, and the Philippine Islands are as defenseless today as they were five years ago. I therefore renew practically the recommendation that I made at that time, that at least one strategic position be fortified beyond the possibility of capture by any foreign fleet or fleets. There should certainly be some point or points fortified that would afford a refuge for our naval and commercial ships. The harbors of Manila, Subig Bay, Cebu and Iloilo have been selected by the engineers as suitable positions. A fair estimate of the cost of emplacements, high-power guns, mortars and rapid-fire guns, magazines and a sufficient amount of ammunition at these places would not be less than twenty million dollars.

Subig Bay is one of the strongest natural positions that I have ever seen. It is completely land-locked, and is capable of being made impregnable. A land force of 10,000 men ought to hold it against ten times that number. This harbor has plenty of deep water, and affords a good anchorage. The climate is very favorable, and the topography most suitable for land defense. It is in every way one of the most important positions for military and naval purposes in the Archipelago. Dockyards,

machine shops, foundries, coaling facilities, arsenals and all appliances for the construction and repair of naval or commercial vessels could be provided at that position.

In my journeys through the Archipelago I was frequently appealed to to aid in assisting the people to obtain a food supply, of which they will be in great need in the near future. I do not think there is today a people so sorely afflicted as the eight millions of inhabitants of this Archipelago. Their country has been devastated by war, and several provinces are now suffering severely as the result of reconcentration in the past. In some places locusts have destroyed the crops. Pestilence has prevailed, having been in some districts a serious scourge, resulting in the reported death of nearly 75,000 people, while it is estimated that the number not reported is fully as large. But the most serious affliction in its results is the destruction of the agricultural animals. Governor Taft stated that in the estimation of the civil authorities fully 90 per cent. had been destroyed. On the island of Luzon alone it is estimated that there were formerly 100,000 carabao and a proportionate number on the other islands. The same disease which has been so destructive to the carabao also destroyed the other domestic cattle, of which there were two years ago an abundant supply. As the natives are largely dependent upon the carabao for the cultivation of their fields in the production of rice, tobacco and other products and for the moving of the hemp from the country to water communication, it is fair to estimate that not one-fifth of the ground can be cultivated and crops produced as formerly until these animals can be replaced. Carabao can be purchased to some extent in China, India, Siam and on the island of Borneo, but they are difficult to transport, and I think can only be shipped on the upper decks of vessels, and then have to be frequently deluged with water. The small trading vessels that go to the islands are not suitable for the transportation of such animals.

The daily papers published in the islands are making frequent references to the famine, and this subject should receive immediate and serious attention. The crisis has not yet been reached, but will probably occur within six months. At that time Congress will not be in session and it will be impossible to take necessary action. I therefore sent the following despatch just before leaving the Archipelago, in order that timely action might be taken:

"Subig Bay, Nov. 29, 1902.

"Secretary of War Washington:

"In my judgment, five regiments, 1,500 men each, Infantry and Cavalry, should be sent yearly. Four transports will transport them, with all needed supplies, and take returning regiments. The remaining transports should be used to bring out wheat and corn, and then used to bring in carabaos and cattle to replace 90 per cent. destroyed. These people are suffering from effects of war and pestilence, and famine must prevail in six months unless prompt and efficient measures are taken.

"MILES, Lieutenant General."

The Government has at present a small fleet of large transports that could be advantageously used to avert the suffering

that must occur in the Philippine Islands in a very short time unless proper precautions are taken. As the military force has been largely reduced in the Archipelago, I estimate that not more than four of the transports will be required to take the necessary one-third or one-half of the present number of troops to the islands and return the same number each year. Therefore it seems to me that the most available means of relieving the distress of these people would be to utilize such transports as could be spared from the service and to load them with corn or wheat in San Francisco, Portland or on Puget Sound, move them to the Philippine Islands, and, as most of them were originally built for the purpose of transporting animals, they could then be sent to any point where carabao could be obtained and bring them to the islands in the most expeditious and least expensive way. At the same time they could bring a sufficient quantity of rice to supply the immediate demand. If prompt measures are taken to execute such a plan as is here outlined, it will avoid the great suffering and distress that must otherwise prevail, and at the same time be the most effective and expeditious method of restoring the people to a self-supporting condition.

A special report is herewith submitted.

I have the honor to remain,

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES.

Lieutenant General, Commanding U. S. Army.

A SPECIAL REPORT FROM GENERAL MILES.

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, Feb. 19, 1903.

The Honorable, The Secretary of War:

Sir.—I have the honor to submit the following special report: In going from Calamba to Batangas on the 9th of November last, I noticed that the country appeared to have been devastated, large sections lying waste, and in the thirty-eight miles ride I did not notice any of the large fields under cultivation. Small patches of ground were being cultivated, but I should not think enough to supply food for the people that I saw along the road. It was an open country, and easy of observation. The people appeared to be more depressed than in any other section of the archipelago. There were but very few men along the road.

Stopping at Lipa, one of the principal towns, to change horses, while at lunch with the commanding officer one of the officers reported that some citizens desired to speak to me, which request was granted. The party consisted of Gorbio Catibnic, the Acting Presidente of the town; Gregorio Aguilera, ex-Presidente; Mr. Jose Luz, treasurer; Dr. Sixto Roxas and Mr. Raphael Dymayuga. The conversation was in Spanish, and Colonel Maus, aide-de-camp, and the last named man acted as interpreter. These men were intelligent, well educated, very much in earnest and apparently sincere. They stated that they desired to make complaint of the harsh treatment of the people of that community; that they had been concentrated in towns through that section of the country, and had suffered great indignities; that fifteen of their people had been tortured by what is known as the water tor-

ture, and that one man, a highly respected citizen, aged sixty-five, named Vincente Luna, while suffering from effects of the torture and unconscious, was dragged into his house, which had been set on fire, and burned to death. They stated that these atrocities were committed by a company of scouts under command of Lieutenant Hennessey, and that their people had been crowded into towns, 600 being confined in one building. Dr. Roxas stated that he was a practicing physician, and that he was ready to testify before any tribunal that some of those confined died from suffocation. They asked me to look at the building, which I did. It was one story in height, 18 or 20 feet wide and possibly 60 or 70 feet long. I informed them that their statements were of so serious a nature that I thought it better for them to make their complaint in proper form in writing and send it to me at Manila by the 25th of the month, when I expected to return to that place. I have no reasons to disbelieve their statements: in fact, the instances of torture and the case of the man Luna having been tortured and burned to death are confirmed by other reports. A written statement, however, was never received by me and whether any influence was brought to bear to prevent their making a statement, either by persuasion or coercion, I am not prepared to say at the present time.

On the island of Cebu it was reported, and in fact published in a Cebu paper, called El Pueblo, dated Nov. 2, 1902, that two officers, Captain Samuels, 44th Inf., J. S. V., and Lieutenant Feeter, 19th Inf., had committed similar atrocities against the people of that island.

It was also reported that at Laoga, on the island of Luzon, two natives were whipped to death.

At Tacloban, Leyte, it was reported that Major Glenn ordered Lieutenant Caulfield, Philippine Scouts, to take eight prisoners out into the country, and if they did not guide him to the camp of the insurgent, Quison, he was not to bring them back. It was stated that the men were so taken out, and that they either did not or could not do so as directed. One of the men who had a son among the scouts was spared, but the others were separated into parties, numbering three and four respectively, and while tied together, were all murdered by being shot or bayoneted to death, some being in a kneeling position at the time. The pretence was made that they were killed while attempting to escape, but so far as I know, no official report was ever made of the circumstance. These facts have been reported by Major Watts, who investigated the case. Besides Lieutenant Caulfield, Civilian Scouts Ramos, Preston, Corn and McKeen were participants.

At Calbayog, Samar, it was reported that several men in that district had been subjected to the water torture. I saw three men who stated that they had been subjected to this treatment. One was the presidente of the town, Mr. Rozales, who showed me long, deep scars on his arm which he said were caused by the cords by which he was bound cutting into his flesh. The second man was named Jose Borja, of the same place, and the third was Padre Jose Diaznes, who stated that he was one of the three priests who had been subjected to torture by the troops

under command of Lieutenant Gaujot, 10th Cav.; that his front teeth had been knocked out, which was apparent; that he was otherwise maltreated, and that he was robbed of \$300 at the time. It was also stated that these three priests were taken out to be killed, and were only saved by the prompt action of Major Carrington, 1st Inf., who sent out for them. Lieutenant Gaujot was tried, pleaded guilty, and given the trivial sentence of three months' suspension from command, forfeiting \$50 of his pay per month for the same period. His pleading guilty prevented all the facts and circumstances being developed.

It appears that Major Glenn, Lieutenant Conger, A. D. C., and a party of assistants and native scouts, were moved from place to place, for the purpose of extorting statements by means of torture, and it became so notorious that this party was called "Glenn's Brigade." Whether it was possible for officers to be engaged in such acts without the personal knowledge of the general upon whose staff they were serving at the time, namely, Brigadier General Hughes, I leave for others to conjecture.

These facts came to my notice in a casual way, and many others of similar character have been reported in different parts of the archipelago. In fact, I was informed that it was common talk at places where officers congregated that such transactions had been carried on either with the connivance or approval of certain commanding officers. It is, however, most gratifying to state that such atrocities had been condemned by such commanders as Generals Lawton, Wade, Sumner, Lee, Baldwin and others.

I found that with certain officers the impression prevailed that such acts were justifiable, and I felt it my duty, in order to correct such an erroneous and dangerous impression, and to prevent the possibility of such acts being committed in future, which must impair the good name of American arms and bring discredit to our service for all time, to address to the Division Commander the following letter of instructions:

"Headquarters of the Army,

"Manila, P. I., Nov. 28, 1902.

"The Commanding General, Division of the Philippines:

"Sir:—The Lieutenant General Commanding the Army directs me to inform you that his attention having been called to matters concerning the instruction and discipline of the troops, it has come to his knowledge that certain methods have been used to extort information from Filipinos in the custody of the military, and that other acts have been committed which are not in accordance with the rules of civilized warfare and are detrimental to the honor and discipline of the army. The misconstruing and adroit misinterpretation of orders may be as injurious to the service as a wanton disregard of them.

"The evil methods above referred to are most injurious to the service, whether designedly or inadvertently followed, and the practice of such unauthorized and unwarranted acts tends to give the junior officers and soldiers of the army an impression that such acts are justifiable and customary in civilized warfare. In order to correct such a dangerous and injurious impression, and that there may be no mis-

understanding in the future, the Lieutenant General directs that any orders, circulars, or personal instructions, or any parts thereof, from whatever source, that suggest, inspire, encourage, or permit any acts of cruelty and unwarranted severity be annulled, cancelled and rescinded, and such acts are hereby strictly prohibited. Acts of retaliation can only be authorized by the highest military authorities, and then should only be resorted to as measures for the safety of an army.

"The attention of your entire command is directed to Paragraph 16, General Orders, No. 100, War Department, A. G. O., April 24, 1863, which will be strictly complied with.

"The excuse that the unusual conditions justify the measures herein condemned is without foundation and cannot prevail. The Lieutenant General is gratified to know that a very great many officers of the army, including yourself, of high rank, great experience and most commendable records, as well as those occupying subordinate positions, with their commands have, in the prosecution of hostilities in the Philippines, effectively conducted their military operations without resorting to any of the methods prohibited by the rules of civilized warfare, and attained the best results, thereby reflecting the highest credit and honor upon themselves, their commands, the army and the nation.

"It is the duty of the army to preserve unscathed the high character it has maintained for more than a century, and it is gratifying to know that a majority of the officers and soldiers have upheld that standard under all circumstances.

"I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

"MARION P. MAUS,

"Lieutenant Colonel, Aide-de-Camp."

In my judgment nothing could be more detrimental to the military service of the United States, or more discredit to American arms, than the commission, or in the slightest degree the justification, of such acts, which belong to a different age and civilization than our own.

On returning to Manila my attention was called by a communication from the Division Commander (copy enclosed herewith) to a transaction, so far as I have ever known in all my experience or reading, is without precedent and in direct violation of law. It appears that in the district in which General Bell, commanding the 3rd Brigade, operated, some 400,000 people were concentrated in towns under what is known as the order of reconcentration. They were given but fifteen days to gather in what little property they had and come into these towns. As the order states, after that their property was subject to destruction or confiscation. They were held in these places for several months, until they had nearly exhausted what little substance they had. If it had been continued two weeks longer they either would have had to be fed or would have starved. During this time General Bell and Colonel Woodruff, of the Commissary Department, entered into an arrangement by which money, in the hands of the Commissary Department, which had been appropriated by Congress to support

the Army, was used in buying large quantities of second quality rice, which was shipped, together with large quantities of sugar, salt, and damaged flour, at Government expense, and hauled to different places for distribution by Government teams, or by private teams forced into service without compensation. There to be sold, not at cost, but at a profit of 25 per cent., according to General Bell's statement, or ranging from 25 per cent. to 100 per cent., according to the communication of General Davis. One excuse for entering into this transaction and not permitting the ordinary traders to supply rice to the community was the fear that it would go into the hands of the insurgents, but the distribution of supplies in this way was continued long after Malvar surrendered, and when it was publicly stated that there were no insurgents in the field. Not only was this second quality of rice purchased and sold to a starving community in this way, but, according to the statement of Colonel Woodruff, 128,000 pounds of damaged flour was also sent to be sold at the invoice price of good flour, together with the added profits that might be charged. In addition to the cost and the profits, the persons distributing this rice were authorized to compensate themselves. It does not appear what the compensation was, whether large or small.

In the communication of General Davis it will be noticed that he states that these people were considered prisoners of war, but we might challenge history to produce an instance where prisoners of war, reduced, as the official documents indicate, to a starving condition, have been compelled to buy food at a large profit from those who held them as prisoners. Neither can the transaction be justified on any grounds of philanthropic motive. It has already brought a serious scandal upon the Service, and is in direct violation of law.

To give some idea of the magnitude of this transaction, nearly 21,000,000 pounds of rice and other supplies were furnished by the Commissary Department at a cost (exclusive of the value of the damaged flour) of \$306,320.57. This is outside of the cost of transportation, which is not stated. It can only be judged approximately. To move that amount of supplies it would require a fleet of sixteen schooners or small steamers carrying 600 tons each, or twenty-six freight trains of twenty-five cars each, each loaded with 32,000 pounds per car, or 5,250 six mule Army wagons and 31,500 mules. The most extraordinary feature of this transaction is that while it was disapproved by the Division Commander, who, on the first day of his assuming command, issued an order stopping it and turned the matter over to the civil authorities, they have taken the matter up and continued the transaction under a special act of the Commission, as shown in the accompanying papers; and what is still more remarkable they have authorized the profits or revenue derived from this transaction to be used on roads and for agricultural experiments and the purchase of traction cars and locomotives, and for other similar purposes.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Lieut. Gen. Commanding the U. S. Army.